Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core

DOI10.1007/s00186-013-0439-4zbMath1275.91013OpenAlexW2057486112MaRDI QIDQ376722

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal

Publication date: 19 November 2013

Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-013-0439-4

zbMATH Keywords

accessibilitysimple gamesexcess functioncoalition structure corecore stabilityoutsider independent dominationpayoff configurationveto player

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (5)

On the characterizations of viable proposals ⋮ Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem ⋮ Paths to stability for overlapping group structures ⋮ The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games ⋮ The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments

Cites Work

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• Core stability in chain-component additive games
• Cores of convex games
• A Dynamic Theory for the Class of Games with Nonempty Cores
• Viable Proposals
• Core Stability of Minimum Coloring Games
• The kernel of a cooperative game

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