Two-party competition with persistent policies

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.03.014zbMath1297.91131OpenAlexW2065701946MaRDI QIDQ403720

Jean Guillaume Forand

Publication date: 29 August 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.014

zbMATH Keywords

Markov perfect equilibriumdynamic electoral competitionpolicy convergencepolicy persistence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (6)

Sorting in iterated incumbency contests ⋮ Electoral competition with costly policy changes: a dynamic perspective ⋮ Representative voting games ⋮ Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions ⋮ Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments ⋮ Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players

Cites Work

• A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model
• A dynamical model of political equilibrium
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• On dynamic compromise
• On the benefits of party competition
• A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
• On the Faustian Dynamics of Policy and Political Power
• Competence and Ideology
• Political Motivations
• Candidates, Credibility, and Re-election Incentives

This page was built for publication: Two-party competition with persistent policies