Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule
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Publication:430893
DOI10.1007/s11238-011-9283-2zbMath1242.91050OpenAlexW1968714173MaRDI QIDQ430893
Takuma Wakayama, Toyotaka Sakai
Publication date: 26 June 2012
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9283-2
Related Items (4)
Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities ⋮ Strategy-proof and fair reallocation with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results ⋮ Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences
Cites Work
- Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
- An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
- Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
- A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
- A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
- Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- A note on Thomson's characterizations of the uniform rule
- Indifference and the uniform rule
- Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
- A simple characterization of the uniform rule
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
- Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
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