Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.011zbMath1302.91017OpenAlexW2091408830MaRDI QIDQ485772

Dominik Karos

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.011

zbMATH Keywords

hedonic gamescore stabilityapex gamesstrong monotony

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (3)

A note on monotonic power indices, smaller coalitions, and new members ⋮ A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability ⋮ Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities

Cites Work

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• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
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• The core-partition of a hedonic game
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Stable governments and the semistrict core
• Government versus opposition: who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag?
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• Characterization of the Banzhaf–Coleman Index
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index

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