One man, one bid

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.10.003zbMath1393.91047OpenAlexW2536073781MaRDI QIDQ523013

Jacob K. Goeree, Jing-Jing Zhang

Publication date: 20 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.003

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsquantal response equilibriumbidding versus votingelectoral design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (5)

A method for identifying parameterizations of the compensation election and quadratic voting that admit pure-strategy equilibria ⋮ The price of `one person, one vote' ⋮ Efficient voting with penalties ⋮ Strategic vote trading under complete information ⋮ Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A simple mechanism for resolving conflict
• Multibidding game under uncertainty
• An experimental study of storable votes
• Storable votes
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• Incentives in Teams
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Preplay contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
• Quantal Response Equilibrium

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