Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property

DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0187-0zbMath1211.91041OpenAlexW2034395965MaRDI QIDQ532755

Takumi Kongo, Yoshio Kamijo

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0187-0

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueaxiomatizationbalanced cycle contributions property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (20)

Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification ⋮ The balanced contributions property for equal contributors ⋮ Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value ⋮ Impacts of boycotts concerning the Shapley value and extensions ⋮ Preservation of risk in capital markets ⋮ The \(\alpha \)-egalitarian Myerson value of games with communication structure ⋮ Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value ⋮ Effects of Players’ Nullification and Equal (Surplus) Division Values ⋮ The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity ⋮ NON-COOPERATIVE AND AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE AVERAGE LEXICOGRAPHIC VALUE ⋮ The position value and the structures of graphs ⋮ Balanced contributions based on indirect claims and the Shapley value ⋮ Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value ⋮ A fuzzy cooperative game theoretic approach for multinational water resource spatiotemporal allocation ⋮ Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games ⋮ Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games? ⋮ Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value ⋮ Properties based on relative contributions for cooperative games with transferable utilities ⋮ On a class of solidarity values ⋮ On a new method of analyzing properties of efficient, symmetric and linear values of TU-games

Cites Work

• An axiomatization of the \(\tau\)-value
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
• On cores and indivisibility
• NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS

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