Computability of simple games: a complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities
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Publication:553522
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.12.003zbMath1222.91017arXiv1102.4037WikidataQ56387528 ScholiaQ56387528MaRDI QIDQ553522
H. Reiju Mihara, Masahiro Kumabe
Publication date: 27 July 2011
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1102.4037
Related Items
Computability of simple games: a complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities, The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games, Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
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