Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model
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Publication:629322
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.008zbMath1244.91055MaRDI QIDQ629322
Publication date: 9 March 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/papers/p3837-2005-07-25.pdf
Related Items
Termination as an incentive device, Optimal self-enforcement and termination, Investment and bilateral insurance, Ambiguity in dynamic contracts, Optimal CEO turnover, Outside opportunities and termination, Optimal contract for the principal-agent under Knightian uncertainty
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