Graphical congestion games

DOI10.1007/s00453-010-9417-xzbMath1229.91078MaRDI QIDQ639291

Luca Moscardelli, Michele Flammini, Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli

Publication date: 20 September 2011

Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-010-9417-x

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrium; congestion games; price of anarchy; algorithmic game theory; price of stability; social knowledge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A43: Games involving graphs

Related Items

Graphical potential games, Social context congestion games, The impact of social ignorance on weighted congestion games, Congestion games with capacitated resources, Inefficiency of games with social context, Coordination games on graphs, On social envy-freeness in multi-unit markets, Convergence Dynamics of Graphical Congestion Games

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