Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.04.004zbMath1274.91228OpenAlexW1976548438MaRDI QIDQ645657

Harold Houba, Quan Wen

Publication date: 10 November 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.004

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingnegotiationtime preferenceendogenous threatsHicks paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring ⋮ Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining ⋮ Backward induction and unacceptable offers ⋮ Bargaining with costly competition for the right to propose ⋮ Relative concerns and delays in bargaining with private information

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
• On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• The policy bargaining model
• Valuating payoff streams under unequal discount factors
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Negotiation games with unobservable mixed disagreement actions

This page was built for publication: Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences