Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games

DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0277-7zbMath1236.91020OpenAlexW1675938143MaRDI QIDQ662276

Sylvain Béal, Philippe Solal, Eric Rémila

Publication date: 22 February 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20955/1/MPRA_paper_20955.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecompensationsequal surplus divisioncompensation solutionsrelative fairness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution ⋮ Efficient extensions of communication values ⋮ Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value ⋮ Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure ⋮ Pyramidal values ⋮ On the Position Value for Special Classes of Networks

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