Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings

DOI10.1016/0097-3165(84)90056-6zbMath0546.06009OpenAlexW2001980959MaRDI QIDQ798345

N. E. Zubov

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Theory. Series A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0097-3165(84)90056-6

zbMATH Keywords

finite distributive latticestable matchingspreference ordering

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Partial orders, general (06A06) Permutations, words, matrices (05A05) Structure and representation theory of distributive lattices (06D05)

Related Items

Eccentricity, center and radius computations on the cover graphs of distributive lattices with applications to stable matchings ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems ⋮ Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets ⋮ On the stable marriage polytope ⋮ Finding a Level Ideal of a Poset ⋮ Every finite distributive lattice is isomorphic to the minimizer set of an \(M^\natural \)-concave set function ⋮ Linear programming brings marital bliss ⋮ Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ Stable matching: An integer programming approach ⋮ Counterexamples of small size for three-sided stable matching with cyclic preferences ⋮ The presence of lattice theory in discrete problems of mathematical social sciences. Why. ⋮ A counterexample of size 20 for the problem of finding a 3-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences ⋮ The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences ⋮ Entering classes in the college admissions model ⋮ Understanding the generalized median stable matchings ⋮ Antimatroids induced by matchings ⋮ Coalescence on the real line ⋮ Center Stable Matchings and Centers of Cover Graphs of Distributive Lattices ⋮ Complexity of the sex-equal stable marriage problem ⋮ Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets ⋮ THE TWO-SIDED MATCHING PROBLEM: ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT ISSUES ⋮ The Generalized Median Stable Matchings: Finding Them Is Not That Easy ⋮ The diameter of the stable marriage polytope: bounding from below ⋮ Stable Matching in Large Economies ⋮ Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings for a small stable marriage instance ⋮ EMPLOYMENT BY LOTTO REVISITED ⋮ Bipartite choices ⋮ Characterization of cores of assignment games ⋮ A unifying approach to the structures of the stable matching problems

Cites Work

• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings