The learnability of voting rules

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2009.03.003zbMath1191.68524OpenAlexW2067594415MaRDI QIDQ840821

Ariel D. Procaccia, Aviv Zohar, Yoni Peleg, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Publication date: 14 September 2009

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2009.03.003

zbMATH Keywords

computational learning theorymultiagent systemscomputational social choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (8)

Voting: a machine learning approach ⋮ Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view ⋮ Incentive compatible regression learning ⋮ Robust winner determination in positional scoring rules with uncertain weights ⋮ Algorithms for strategyproof classification ⋮ On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections ⋮ A new perspective on implementation by voting trees ⋮ Optimizing positional scoring rules for rank aggregation

Uses Software

• LPbook

Cites Work

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• Sophisticated voting rules: The case of two tournaments
• Probably Approximate Learning of Sets and Functions
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• A new perspective on implementation by voting trees
• Financial Cryptography and Data Security
• Linear programming. Foundations and extensions

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