Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
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Publication:899767
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(86)90004-2zbMath1328.91131OpenAlexW4230336432MaRDI QIDQ899767
Publication date: 1 January 2016
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90004-2
Related Items (12)
Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly ⋮ Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions ⋮ Equilibria in open common value auctions ⋮ Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders ⋮ Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions ⋮ On dominance solvable auctions in the general symmetric model ⋮ Value-rationalizability in auction bidding ⋮ An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information ⋮ An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values ⋮ Successful uninformed bidding ⋮ Private information revelation in common-value auctions ⋮ Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
- A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions
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