Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
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Publication:910349
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90009-9zbMath0695.90103MaRDI QIDQ910349
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90009-9
91A05: 2-person games
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Cites Work
- On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Signalling with Many Signals
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
- Informational Equilibrium
- Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
- Sequential Equilibria
- Strategic Information Transmission
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information
