Computing the minimal covering set

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.04.001zbMath1142.91725MaRDI QIDQ943589

Felix Brandt, Felix Fischer

Publication date: 10 September 2008

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.04.001

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexity; social choice theory; uncovered set; minimal covering set; essential set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90C05: Linear programming

91D10: Models of societies, social and urban evolution

91-04: Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance

Related Items

A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality, The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering sets, Minimal retentive sets in tournaments, The computational complexity of weak saddles, A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set, A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions, Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions, The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior, Uncovered sets, The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets

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