Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples
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Publication:975759
DOI10.1007/s10878-009-9257-2zbMath1189.91102OpenAlexW2054731762MaRDI QIDQ975759
Eric J. McDermid, David F. Manlove
Publication date: 11 June 2010
Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/25729/1/25729.pdf
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