Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples

DOI10.1007/s10878-009-9257-2zbMath1189.91102OpenAlexW2054731762MaRDI QIDQ975759

Eric J. McDermid, David F. Manlove

Publication date: 11 June 2010

Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/25729/1/25729.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

NP-completenesspolynomial-time algorithmstable matching problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Matching models (91B68)

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• Stable marriage with ties and bounded length preference lists
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• NP-complete stable matching problems
• Three Fast Algorithms for Four Problems in Stable Marriage
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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