The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
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Publication:986550
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2010.05.005zbMath1193.91099MaRDI QIDQ986550
Robert W. Irving, David F. Manlove, Tamás Fleiner, Péter Biró
Publication date: 11 August 2010
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/38576/1/38576.pdf
NP-hardness; college admissions problem; common quotas; lower quotas; hospitals/Residents problem; nested set systems
68Q25: Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity
90B90: Case-oriented studies in operations research
91B68: Matching models
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