Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
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Publication:1036567
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.003zbMath1180.91019MaRDI QIDQ1036567
Publication date: 13 November 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.003
common knowledge; common prior assumption; universal beliefs space; epistemic conditions for equilibria
Related Items
PEOPLE WITH COMMON PRIORS CAN AGREE TO DISAGREE, Weakly rational expectations, The cycles approach, Robustness of equilibrium in the Kyle model of informed speculation, From posteriors to priors via cycles, Consistent beliefs in extensive form games, Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
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