Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.035zbMath1188.91060MaRDI QIDQ1036572

William S. Zwicker, Josep Freixas

Publication date: 13 November 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.035

zbMATH Keywords

abstention; anonymity; (\(j,k)\) games; absolute and simple strict majority rule; games with several levels of approval; grading systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B12: Voting theory

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Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention, The influence relation for ternary voting games, Quaternary dichotomous voting rules, Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention, Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity, Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output, Anonymity, monotonicity, and quota pair systems, Complete voting systems with two classes of voters: weightedness and counting, On Dedekind's problem for complete simple games, Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?, A policy-based rationalization of collective rules: dimensionality, specialized houses, and decentralized authority, The inverse problem for power distributions in committees, SOME OPEN PROBLEMS IN SIMPLE GAMES

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