Drastic innovations and multiplicity of optimal licensing policies
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Publication:1046241
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2009.04.011zbMath1179.91093OpenAlexW2120031631MaRDI QIDQ1046241
Giorgos Stamatopoulos, Debapriya Sen
Publication date: 21 December 2009
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.04.011
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cites Work
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- The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results
- License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers
- Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
- On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- Fee versus royalty reconsidered
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