Cournot duopoly with two production periods

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90109-8zbMath0627.90009OpenAlexW1994006552MaRDI QIDQ1092777

Garth Saloner

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90109-8

zbMATH Keywords

duopolysubgame perfect equilibriatwo stagesworst Stackelberg outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (23)

Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination ⋮ Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence ⋮ Multilateral bargaining with concession costs ⋮ Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly ⋮ Duopoly equilibria when firms can change their decision once ⋮ Endogenous preemption on both sides of a market ⋮ A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game ⋮ Strategic rationing in Stackelberg games ⋮ Cournot duopoly with two production periods and cost differentials ⋮ On flexibility in oligopoly ⋮ Inventories, market structure, and price volatility ⋮ On the endogeneity of Cournot--Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation ⋮ Contests with multiple rounds ⋮ To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets ⋮ Randomized strategy equilibrium in the action commitment game with costs of leading ⋮ Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment ⋮ How risk disciplines pre-commitment ⋮ On the first mover advantage in Stackelberg quantity games ⋮ Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, demand uncertainty, and asymmetric outcomes ⋮ ON COURNOT COMPETITION UNDER RANDOM YIELD ⋮ Dynamic capacity choice in a Bertrand-Edgeworth framework ⋮ Endogenous Stackelberg leadership ⋮ Explaining cross-supplies

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