A note on uncertainty and cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
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Publication:1095053
DOI10.1007/BF01756290zbMath0631.90099OpenAlexW2095342151MaRDI QIDQ1095053
Publication date: 1987
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01756290
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