A set of axioms for a value for partition function games

DOI10.1007/BF01248494zbMath0671.90107OpenAlexW2091208258WikidataQ114693999 ScholiaQ114693999MaRDI QIDQ1119497

Edward M. Bolger

Publication date: 1989

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01248494

zbMATH Keywords

coalition structurepartition function gamesset of axioms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites Work

• Power indices for multicandidate voting games
• Values of games in partition function form
• N‐person games in partition function form