Social learning and the shadow of the past
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Publication:1622368
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.003zbMath1417.91193OpenAlexW2732690729WikidataQ129510740 ScholiaQ129510740MaRDI QIDQ1622368
Publication date: 19 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/79930/1/MPRA_paper_79930.pdf
Related Items (3)
Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications ⋮ Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics
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