Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2016.12.011zbMath1402.91522OpenAlexW2560667248MaRDI QIDQ1753433

Martin Bichler, Franz Diebold

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.12.011

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto efficiencystrategy-proofnessmatching under preferencescourse assignmentdecision support management

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (7)

Two-sided matching with indifferences ⋮ Non-monetary coordination mechanisms for time slot allocation in warehouse delivery ⋮ Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences ⋮ Mathematical models for stable matching problems with ties and incomplete lists ⋮ Minimal envy and popular matchings ⋮ Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare ⋮ College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach

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