Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts with early-exit options: the case of conservation contracts

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2017.11.028zbMath1403.91166OpenAlexW2769896629MaRDI QIDQ1754247

Luca Di Corato, Michele Moretto, Cesare Dosi

Publication date: 30 May 2018

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.11.028

zbMATH Keywords

real optionsauctions/biddingpublic procurementconservation contracts,contract breach

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

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