A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
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Publication:1787988
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.008zbMath1397.91188OpenAlexW2822981468WikidataQ129539633 ScholiaQ129539633MaRDI QIDQ1787988
Publication date: 8 October 2018
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.008
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Cites Work
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