Three methods to share joint costs or surplus

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2534zbMath1016.91056OpenAlexW1980329534MaRDI QIDQ1806203

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 20 December 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/82da53ab30d5125ce312a0cc8abb19b2c761eecb

zbMATH Keywords

cost functioncost sharing methodsheterogeneous goodsvariable demands

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (31)

Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation ⋮ Sharing sequential values in a network ⋮ A proposal for sharing costs ⋮ A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation ⋮ Applied cost allocation: the DEA-Aumann-Shapley approach ⋮ The Moulin-Shenker rule ⋮ Congestion allocation for distributed networks: an experimental study ⋮ Heterogeneous cost sharing, the directional serial rule ⋮ Shapley value-based payment calculation for energy exchange between micro- and utility grids ⋮ Cost allocation schemes: An asymptotic approach ⋮ A subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing ⋮ Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments ⋮ Asymmetric cost sharing mechanisms ⋮ The implications of the ranking axiom for discrete cost sharing methods ⋮ Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods. ⋮ Minimum cost spanning tree problems with indifferent agents ⋮ The additivity and dummy axioms in the discrete cost sharing model ⋮ Secure implementation in production economies ⋮ Nearly serial sharing methods ⋮ Design of price mechanisms for network resource allocation via price of anarchy ⋮ Cost Sharing in Production Economies ⋮ Cost allocation and convex data envelopment ⋮ Prices in mixed cost allocation problems ⋮ Hart and Mas-Colell consistency in PERT problems ⋮ Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing ⋮ Ordinal cost sharing ⋮ Ordinal proportional cost sharing ⋮ On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing ⋮ Coherent cost-sharing rules ⋮ Strategic properties of heterogeneous serial cost sharing ⋮ Uniqueness of equilibrium in cost sharing games

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