Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values

DOI10.1007/BF01240041zbMath0838.90146MaRDI QIDQ1897343

Vincent Feltkamp

Publication date: 30 May 1996

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (32)

Protectionism and blocking power indices ⋮ A solution concept for network games: the role of multilateral interactions ⋮ Graphs and (levels of) cooperation in games: two ways how to allocate the surplus ⋮ On an axiomatization of the Banzhaf value without the additivity axiom ⋮ Characterizations of the Deegan-Packel and Johnston power indices ⋮ Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value ⋮ The Banzhaf value as a design tool in coalitional control ⋮ Banzhaf random forests: cooperative game theory based random forests with consistency ⋮ Semivalues as power indices. ⋮ The pairwise egalitarian solution. ⋮ Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value ⋮ Marginality, differential marginality, and the Banzhaf value ⋮ Parallel axiomatizations of weighted and multiweighted Shapley values, random order values, and the Harsanyi set ⋮ The Shapley-Shubik index for simple games with multiple alternatives ⋮ Null, nullifying, and necessary agents: parallel characterizations of the Banzhaf and Shapley values ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues ⋮ The Banzhaf value for generalized probabilistic communication situations ⋮ Computing power indices: multilinear extensions and new characterizations ⋮ A NOTE ON REGULAR SEMIVALUES ⋮ Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index ⋮ A note on multinomial probabilistic values ⋮ Collusion, quarrel, and the Banzhaf value ⋮ A decisiveness index for simple games ⋮ Power and potential maps induced by any semivalue: some algebraic properties and computation by multilinear extensions ⋮ An axiomatic characterization for regular semivalues ⋮ Characterizations of power indices based on null player free winning coalitions ⋮ New mathematical properties of the Banzhaf value ⋮ A NOTE ON THE CARRERAS-COLEMAN DECISIVENESS INDEX ⋮ COMPARING POWER INDICES ⋮ Weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players: characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues ⋮ The banzhaf – coleman index for games withralternatives ⋮ The modified Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure: An axiomatic characterization.

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
• The Shapley value on some lattices of monotonic games
• On balanced games and games with committee control
• Coalition formation in simple games with dominant players
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Measures of powerlessness in simple games.

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