Automata, repeated games and noise

DOI10.1007/BF00184645zbMath0837.90140OpenAlexW2058674890MaRDI QIDQ1899105

Martin A. Nowak, Esam El-Sedy, Karl Sigmund

Publication date: 13 May 1996

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00184645

zbMATH Keywords

prisoner's dilemmatwo-state automata

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators, On calculating the Krohn-Rhodes decomposition of automata, Zero-determinant strategies in infinitely repeated three-player prisoner's dilemma game, The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence, Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence?, Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations, Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners' dilemma game, Seven rules to avoid the tragedy of the commons, Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?, Iterated symmetric three-player prisoner's dilemma game, The effect of noise and average relatedness between players in iterated games, The payoff matrix of repeated asymmetric \(2\times 2\) games, Two population three-player prisoner's dilemma game, Zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated games, Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game, How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence, Numerical analysis of a reinforcement learning model with the dynamic aspiration level in the iterated prisoner's dilemma, Evolution of cooperation facilitated by reinforcement learning with adaptive aspiration levels, Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat, On the coexistence of cooperators, defectors and conditional cooperators in the multiplayer iterated prisoner's dilemma, Optimal decision rules in repeated games where players infer an opponent's mind via simplified belief calculation, Zero-determinant strategies in repeated asymmetric games, Combined trust model based on evidence theory in iterated prisoner's dilemma game, A theoretical analysis of temporal difference learning in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game, How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection?, Misreporting behaviour in iterated prisoner's dilemma game with combined trust strategy