The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality

DOI10.1006/game.1996.0018zbMath0848.90130OpenAlexW2021227293MaRDI QIDQ1915704

Ebbe Hendon, Hans Jørgen Jacobson, Brigitte Sloth

Publication date: 1 July 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0018

zbMATH Keywords

decentralizationperfect Bayesian equilibriumsequential equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (21)

Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection? ⋮ Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence ⋮ Dynamic consistency and imperfect recall ⋮ AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. I: Definition and properties ⋮ On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets ⋮ Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players ⋮ Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games ⋮ Belief in the opponents' future rationality ⋮ Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment ⋮ Backward induction in games without perfect recall ⋮ Bayesian and consistent assessments ⋮ Selling options ⋮ Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency ⋮ Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games ⋮ AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. II: From PBE to sequential equilibrium ⋮ Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion ⋮ Exploring the gap between perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium ⋮ Operant Matching as a Nash Equilibrium of an Intertemporal Game ⋮ A model of minimal probabilistic belief revision ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining game with loss aversion ⋮ A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games

This page was built for publication: The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality