Coherent beliefs are not always types.

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(98)00066-4zbMath1099.91507MaRDI QIDQ1966229

Dov Samet, Aviad Heifetz

Publication date: 1999

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Stochastic models in economics (91B70)

Related Items (20)

Admissibility and assumption ⋮ Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning ⋮ When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs? ⋮ An impossibility theorem on beliefs in games ⋮ The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology ⋮ Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games ⋮ An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness ⋮ An infinitary probability logic for type spaces ⋮ Kernel-based type spaces ⋮ Choice structures in games ⋮ On the relationship between hierarchy and type morphisms ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Probability logic of finitely additive beliefs ⋮ Intuitive Probability Logic ⋮ The non-existence of a universal topological type space ⋮ Universal interactive preferences ⋮ Recursively modeling other agents for decision making: a research perspective ⋮ Hierarchies of knowledge: an unbounded stairway ⋮ Iterated dominance revisited ⋮ Topology-free typology of beliefs

Cites Work

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• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Topology-free typology of beliefs
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• The Bayesian formulation of incomplete information. The non-compact case
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game

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