Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2022.127069OpenAlexW4221082220MaRDI QIDQ2139779

Xiaojie Chen, Linjie Liu

Publication date: 19 May 2022

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.13104

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary game theorycorruptioninstitutional punishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91Axx) Mathematical economics (91Bxx) Genetics and population dynamics (92Dxx)

Related Items (3)

Evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks: the impact of asymmetric punishment ⋮ The dynamics of corruption under an optional external supervision service ⋮ The impact of labor subsidy, taxation and corruption on individual behavior

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