Optimal information exchange in contests

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2021.102518zbMath1476.91067OpenAlexW3155656022MaRDI QIDQ2237879

Zhuoqiong (Charlie) Chen

Publication date: 28 October 2021

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102518

zbMATH Keywords

information exchangeinformation sharingcontestsall-pay auctioninformation disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (5)

All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values ⋮ Disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry: The impact of risk aversion ⋮ Knowing your opponents: information disclosure and auction design ⋮ Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations ⋮ Correlated play in weakest-link and best-shot group contests

Cites Work

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• A general model of information sharing in oligopoly
• Information Sharing in Oligopoly
• Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria
• Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I

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