The Egalitarian Shapley value: a generalization based on coalition sizes

DOI10.1007/s10479-020-03675-9zbMath1480.91019MaRDI QIDQ2241241

Rajnish Kumar, Dhrubajit Choudhury, Sudipta Sarangi, Surajit Borkotokey

Publication date: 8 November 2021

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pureadmin.qub.ac.uk/ws/files/211893102/ANOR_revised.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley value; solidarity; egalitarian Shapley value; equal division rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

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