The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.013zbMath1309.91057OpenAlexW2115424428MaRDI QIDQ2254041

Pablo F. Beker, Ángel Hernando-Veciana

Publication date: 4 February 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/82250/1/WRAP-dynamics-bidding-markets-Beker-2015.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

industry dynamicsmarkupsall pay auctionsfinancial constraintsbidding marketsmoney left on the table

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information
• Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
• Identification and Estimation of Auction Models with Unobserved Heterogeneity
• A Model of the Evolution of Duopoly: Does the Asymmetry between Firms Tend to Increase or Decrease?
• Learning-by-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Stochastic Monotonicity and Stationary Distributions for Dynamic Economies
• The Learning Curve, Market Dominance, and Predatory Pricing
• Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game
• High bids and broke winners

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