Dismissals and quits in repeated games

DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0422-0zbMath1185.91041OpenAlexW1997080785MaRDI QIDQ2268132

Pablo Casas-Arce

Publication date: 10 March 2010

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0422-0

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfectiontwo playersfinitely repeated gameBenoit-Krishna theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Multiple agents finitely repeated inspection game with dismissals ⋮ Efficiency may improve when defectors exist ⋮ Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games

Cites Work

• A ``super folk theorem for dynastic repeated games
• Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players
• The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem
• Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
• Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players

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