Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers

DOI10.1016/j.laa.2019.04.027zbMath1422.91039arXiv1710.05218OpenAlexW2951296410WikidataQ127965108 ScholiaQ127965108MaRDI QIDQ2321352

Ngoc Mai Tran, Bo Lin

Publication date: 29 August 2019

Published in: Linear Algebra and its Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.05218

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designtropical geometryRoberts' theoremtropical determinanttropical hyperplane arrangement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (2)

Tropical optimal transport and Wasserstein distances ⋮ The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions

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