The partnered core of a game with side payments

DOI10.1007/s00355-012-0651-9zbMath1287.91014OpenAlexW2232624962MaRDI QIDQ2450086

Eyal Winter, Myrna Holtz Wooders, Philip J. Reny

Publication date: 16 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15874

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (3)

The partnered core of an economy and the partnered competitive equilibrium ⋮ An adaptive model of demand adjustment in weighted majority games ⋮ An extension of the KKMS theorem

Cites Work

• Bargaining in cooperative games
• Cores of partitioning games
• Strongly balanced cooperative games
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• An extension of the KKMS theorem
• The partnered core of an economy and the partnered competitive equilibrium
• Stable networks
• The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
• Link formation in cooperative situations.
• The partnered core of a game without side payments
• Strongly stable networks
• A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game
• The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
• Credible coalitions and the core
• A Further Extension of the KKMS Theorem
• A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
• On Minimal Separating Collections
• The Structure of the Kernel of a Cooperative Game
• The Core of an N Person Game
• Convex Analysis
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