On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria

DOI10.1007/s00182-013-0384-8zbMath1294.91024OpenAlexW2122461471MaRDI QIDQ2453494

Jianfei Shen, Carlos González Pimienta

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2012-01.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

sequential equilibriumperfect equilibriumbackwards inductionquasi-perfect equilibriumlower-hemicontinuityupper-hemicontinuity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (4)

A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria ⋮ The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an \(n\)-player extensive form game ⋮ Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games ⋮ The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension

Cites Work

• A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• On the strategic equivalence of extensive form games
• Two examples of strategic equilibrium
• A new decision method for elementary algebra
• Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic Two-Player Games
• Sequential Equilibria
• Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
• The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium
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