Rationalizable foresight dynamics
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2507679
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.013zbMath1177.91030OpenAlexW2025061683MaRDI QIDQ2507679
Publication date: 5 October 2006
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.013
Nash equilibriumrationalizabilityperfect foresightrationalizable foresightstability under perfect foresight (PF-stability)stability under rationalizable foresight (RF-stability)
Related Items (6)
\(p\)-best response set ⋮ Global analysis of an expectations augmented evolutionary dynamics ⋮ ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY ⋮ Perfect foresight dynamics in games with linear incentives and time symmetry ⋮ Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria ⋮ Social pressure in networks induces public good provision
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- An expository note on individual risk without aggregate uncertainty
- The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables
- A model of random matching
- Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
- Laws of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals
- Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games
- Dynamical systems with a continuum of randomly matched agents
- \(p\)-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics.
- An approach to equilibrium selection
- Industrialization under perfect foresight: A world economy with a continuum of countries
- A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Social Stability and Equilibrium
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- p-Dominance and Belief Potential
This page was built for publication: Rationalizable foresight dynamics
