Inductive game theory: a basic scenario

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.07.009zbMath1156.91012OpenAlexW2150395209MaRDI QIDQ2519062

Mamoru Kaneko, Jeffrey Jude Kline

Publication date: 22 January 2009

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.07.009

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriuminductionmemory functionextensive gameexperienceexperiential foundationinformation piece

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (12)

Partial memories, inductively derived views, and their interactions with behavior ⋮ Symposium: Logic and economics -- interactions between subjective thinking and objective worlds ⋮ Expected utility theory from the frequentist perspective ⋮ Networks of relations and word-of-mouth communication ⋮ A note on the relationship between graphs and information protocols ⋮ Discrimination in festival games with limited observability and accessibility ⋮ Corrigendum to ``Inductive game theory: a basic scenario ⋮ A Measure of Logical Inference and Its Game Theoretical Applications ⋮ Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness ⋮ From memories to inductively derived views: a constructive approach ⋮ Learning games ⋮ Understanding the Other Through Social Roles

Cites Work

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• On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• Non-cooperative games
• Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
• Case-Based Decision Theory
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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