Informed principal with correlation

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.007zbMath1152.91372OpenAlexW2105777867MaRDI QIDQ2519479

Michela Cella

Publication date: 26 January 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:2db1d0ac-3f83-4dd2-87bb-93428ff2fa24

zbMATH Keywords

correlationinformed principalprivate values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (6)

Two-sided strategic information transmission ⋮ Informed principal and countervailing incentives ⋮ Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values ⋮ Informed principal problems in bilateral trading ⋮ An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values ⋮ The strategically ignorant principal

Cites Work

• On the fundamental theorems of general equilibrium
• Optimal contracts with public ex post information
• Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design

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