Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications

DOI10.1007/s00355-003-0202-5zbMath1073.91559OpenAlexW2070589651MaRDI QIDQ2568823

Biung-Ghi Ju

Publication date: 19 October 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1808/272

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (13)

Strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible in production economies ⋮ Non-manipulability vs. individual rationality in a permit sharing problem ⋮ Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies ⋮ Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences ⋮ Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies ⋮ Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents ⋮ Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with Cobb-Douglas preferences ⋮ Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies ⋮ A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies ⋮ Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies ⋮ Strategy-proof risk sharing ⋮ Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees. ⋮ Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies

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