Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras
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Publication:2642552
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0181-4zbMath1180.91117OpenAlexW1971736094MaRDI QIDQ2642552
Publication date: 17 August 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0181-4
Related Items (2)
Cites Work
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