Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem

DOI10.2307/1911157zbMath0624.62014OpenAlexW2140160049MaRDI QIDQ3026036

Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jerry R. Green

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/16056/1/Laffont_16056.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

informationconstructive methodincentivescommitmentimplementabilitycollective decision makingposterior implementationBayesian rulesposterior optimal strategiessocial decision ruletwo-person decisiontwo-stage cooperative process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Decision theory (91B06) Statistical decision theory (62C99)

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