A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes

DOI10.2307/1910411zbMath0413.90004OpenAlexW2059347485MaRDI QIDQ3048532

Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1910411

zbMATH Keywords

social choicemanipulationgroup strategy-proofnesspreference analysisdecision schemesmisrepresenting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (12)

On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties ⋮ On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness ⋮ The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences ⋮ Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness ⋮ Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences ⋮ Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide? ⋮ Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good ⋮ Salvador Barberà ⋮ How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election ⋮ Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers ⋮ Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Constrained allocation of projects to heterogeneous workers with preferences over peers

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