Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2010.00608.XzbMath1202.91049MaRDI QIDQ3065365

Matthias Sutter, Stefan D. Haigner, Martin G. Kocher

Publication date: 5 January 2011

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14) Experimental studies (91A90)

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