Fitness-based models and pairwise comparison models of evolutionary games are typically different—even in unstructured populations
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Publication:3387645
DOI10.1088/1367-2630/17/2/023043zbMath1452.91035OpenAlexW2051079321MaRDI QIDQ3387645
Arne Traulsen, Bin Wu, Benedikt Bauer, Tobias Galla
Publication date: 13 January 2021
Published in: New Journal of Physics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/17/2/023043
Related Items (18)
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